Cognitive and Practice-based Theories of Organisational Knowing and Learning: Incompatible or complementary? by Marshall, Nicholas
 1 
Paper presented at the Organizational Learning, Knowledge and Capabilities 2007 International 
Conference, Ivey Business School, London, Ontario, Canada, 14-17 June 2007. 
 
COGNITIVE AND PRACTICE-BASED THEORIES OF 
ORGANISATIONAL KNOWING AND LEARNING: 
INCOMPATIBLE OR COMPLEMENTARY? 
 
NICK MARSHALL1 
University of Brighton 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Cognitive and practice-based approaches to organisational knowledge and learning are 
typically portrayed as incommensurable, with the result that there has been little 
positive dialogue between the two traditions.  This paper argues that the incompatibility 
of the two sets of approaches has been overstated and that there is actually much that 
each can learn from the other.  Cognitive approaches, which have often been accused of 
offering an effectively individualised, static, and representationalist understanding of 
organisational knowledge, can benefit from taking on board the practice-based view of 
knowledge as historically, culturally, and socially situated.  However, the paper also 
suggests that practice-based theories would do well to draw insights from cognitive 
approaches, particularly regarding the role of cognitive frameworks or schemata in 
guiding knowledge processes.  Without this, practice-based theories struggle to offer a 
fully developed account of how practices are constituted, reproduced, and potentially 
transformed through the interplay between routine and reflective action.  To provide an 
example of how cognitive and practice-based approaches can be integrated, the latter 
part of the paper offers an empirical illustration of how a team of consulting engineers 
represent and perform alternative schemas of project work through their day-to-day 
practices.  This provides the opportunity to reflect on both the theoretical and 
methodological challenges of pursuing a rapprochement between practice-based theory 
and cognitive approaches to organisational knowledge and learning. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Cognitive and practice-based theories have informed two influential strands of the 
literature on organisational knowledge and learning.  There has generally not been a 
great deal of exchange between these two traditions, unless it is to be critical of the 
other.  Practice-based approaches have been especially dismissive of cognitive 
approaches (e.g. Cook and Yanow, 1993; Gherardi, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2006; Gherardi 
and Nicolini, 2002; Lave and Wenger, 1991; Nicolini et al., 2003; Orlikowski, 2000, 
2002; Suchman, 1988).  However, in this paper it is argued that there is actually much 
to be gained from establishing a more productive dialogue between the two 
perspectives.  As with many attempts at fusing insights from multiple theoretical 
positions, there are potential dangers that need to be taken into account.  This is 
particularly the case where the perspectives in question are derived from quite distinct 
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ontological and epistemological positions and grounded in radically different sets of 
guiding assumptions.  Bearing these obstacles in mind, my argument in this paper is two 
fold. 
 
The first part of the argument is to suggest that practice-based theories have been, at 
least partly, justifiable in their criticisms of conventional cognitive approaches, but that 
this in itself is not a reason to dismiss any cognitive accounts of organisational 
knowledge and learning.  Gherardi (2006, p. xv) has argued that cognitive approaches 
suggest “that knowledge resides in the heads of persons, and that it is appropriated, 
transmitted and stored by means of mentalistic processes.  This figure works through the 
dichotomies of mind/body, thought/action, individual/organization.  Its watchword is 
‘organizational learning’, and also ‘cognitive framework’ or ‘traditional cognitive 
learning theory’”.  To a large degree this argument is quite valid.  To the extent that 
cognitive approaches have drawn on models of information processing, it is true that 
they tend towards a rather static, functionalist, and ultimately individualistic portrayal of 
learning as the passive acquisition of knowledge.  Practice-based theories, by contrast, 
emphasise the dynamic, processual, and inescapably social and material character of 
knowing.  Cognition is not something that primarily takes place ‘in the head’ through 
the cold and dispassionate mental operations of individual cognitive agents that are 
somehow detached from the world of activity in which they must necessarily be 
embedded (Lave, 1988).  The information processing tradition underlying cognitive 
approaches also tends towards portraying knowledge in rationalistic (albeit boundedly 
rational) and representational terms (c.f. Rorty, 1979; Wingrad and Flores, 1986).  In 
opposition to this, practice-based theories adopt a more holistic, constructionist position 
in which the various elements of thinking, doing, and being, and the social, cultural, 
historical, and material settings within which they take place are conceived in 
relationships of co-constitution. 
 
From the above characterisation of cognitive approaches it would seem that they have 
little in common with practice-based theories and that a rapprochement between the two 
would be surprising, if not downright ill-advised.  However, there are times when the 
portrayal of the former by the latter often verges on caricature, not really acknowledging 
the changes that have been happening within the cognitive literature that addresses some 
of the criticisms raised (see Schwartz, 1998, for an overview).  Consequently, the 
second element of my argument is to suggest that by being excessively wary of 
invoking any cognitive explanations, practice-based approaches are actually placing an 
unnecessary limitation on themselves.  The main point is that acknowledging a 
cognitive dimension to knowing does not have to be incompatible with a socially 
situated, constructionist, and processual view.  Practice-based approaches make frequent 
mention of the enduring and patterned character of social action, often drawing on 
insights from sociological accounts of practice (e.g. Bourdieu, 1977, 1992; Giddens, 
1979, 1984).  A key issue here is not only about how practices are reproduced over 
time, but also how they are modified and transformed as they are enacted or 
‘instantiated’.  Informed by work on cognitive sociology, I argue that individual and 
collective cognitive frameworks or schemata play a central and dynamic role here 
(Cicourel, 1973, 1981; Zerubavel, 1999).  It is not necessary to see schemata in purely 
computational terms as providing the algorithms and transformation rules that mediate 
between the input and output elements of information processes.  They can be 
conceptualised in much broader and less mechanistic terms as providing the, often 
implicit, unarticulated, and shifting background upon which knowledge and action are 
grounded.  The emphasis here shifts from the rule-based processing of information as 
representations of reality, to the role of interpretative schemas in guiding how unfolding 
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social realities are constituted through processes of enactive sensemaking (Weick, 1979, 
1995).  Schemata provide the crucial link between past, present, and future that permit 
both the reproducibility and transformational capacity of practices, allowing genuine 
agency without voluntarism and regularities of action without determinism. 
 
As well as the conceptual challenges of merging insights from two hitherto quite 
separate, and one might even say antagonistic fields, there are also important 
methodological issues.  Here as well there are important differences between the two 
traditions which, again, have tended, prematurely I would suggest, to be depicted as 
irreconcilable.  Influenced by approaches such as ethnomethodology, practice-based 
theories tend to assume that the situated intelligibility of practices can mainly be 
grasped through observation.  This is because, as Gherardi (2006, p. 30) has argued, 
“actions speak for themselves” since they “‘reflexively’ display their nature as 
meaningful to social actors” and so permit the reconstruction of their meaning by 
external observers.  Cognitive approaches, by contrast, have tended to depend more on 
eliciting the structure, content, and processes of cognition through techniques requiring 
participants to provide a more or less direct account of their perspectives and actions, as 
well as a heavy reliance on experimental and simulation studies.  Certainly many of 
these techniques have been applied in a positivistic fashion that tends to reinforce the 
problems of static, individualistic, and reductionist arguments for which cognitive 
approaches have been rightly criticised (Greeno, 1998).  However, it is by no means 
inevitable that one has to subscribe to a positivist programme in seeking to elicit the 
nature of individual and collective cognition, just as one does not necessarily have to 
rely wholly on attempting to infer the meaning of practices from observation. 
 
To illustrate how the conceptual and methodological task of combining practice-based 
and cognitive approaches might be achieved, the second half of the paper offers an 
example drawn from research currently being conducted by the author into knowledge, 
learning, and communication in multi-functional engineering teams.  This study is 
pursuing a multi-method approach that involves not only observing teams in action 
through ethnographic research, but also using other techniques drawn from studies of 
cognition for mapping individual and shared schemas, which have been applied 
particularly in the areas of organisational strategy and team dynamics (e.g. Cooke et al., 
2000; Hodgkinson, 2005; Huff, 1990; Langan-Fox et al., 2000; Porac and Thomas, 
1990).  One aim is to explore the possibilities and limitations of using techniques from 
cognitive approaches in a more action-orientated and socially situated manner than has 
often been the case previously.  The focus is on considering the intricate interplay 
between individual and group schemata as dynamic, context-dependent, and embodied 
representations that are variably constructed, drawn upon, and revised in the course of 
the day-to-day communicative and other practices of teams of consulting engineers. 
 
 
2. COGNITIVE APPROACHES TO ORGANISATIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND 
LEARNING 
 
As several authors have observed, cognitive approaches form one of the most influential 
strands of the literature on organisational knowledge and learning.  Swan et al. (1999), 
for example, distinguish between cognitive and community models of organisational 
knowledge.  The former, as Sørensen and Lundh-Snis (2001, p. 85) explain, “denotes a 
perspective where valuable knowledge is conceived as being captured and codified from 
individuals, packaged, transmitted and processed through the use of ICT, and hence 
disseminated and used by other individuals in new contexts.  In this perspective, 
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knowledge can also be exploited through the recycling of existing knowledge ‘owned’ 
and ‘experienced’ by individuals in cognitive networks”.  The community model, which 
holds much in common with practice-based theories, by contrast “portrays the 
management of knowledge as socially constructed through interaction within 
communities of practice … Knowledge creation and learning are processes of making 
sense of knowledge in social activities deeply rooted in daily work practice” (ibid., p. 
85).  Other similar characterisations of the organisational knowledge literature include 
the distinction drawn by Cook and Brown (1999) between epistemologies of possession 
and practice, and that by Gherardi (2000) between mentalist or functionalist 
perspectives and practice-based theorising.  Despite differences in terminology, these 
characterisations all refer to one set of approaches to organisational knowledge and 
learning that are strongly informed by ideas drawn from conventional cognitive 
psychology, itself dominantly based on an information processing view of cognition 
(e.g. Anderson, 1983, Broadbent, 1958, Bruner et al., 1956, Fiske and Taylor, 1984, 
McClelland et al., 1987, Miller, 1956, Neisser, 1967, Newell & Simon, 1972).  While 
information processing has proven to be a useful metaphor for processes of 
organisational knowledge and learning, contributing numerous valuable insights, it also 
brings with it some theoretical baggage that ultimately limits its usefulness.   
 
There are three key limitations of orthodox views of cognition that impact upon 
cognitive approaches to organisational knowledge.  These are, firstly, the 
representationalist tendencies of the information processing perspective; secondly, an 
individualistic and mentalist emphasis that limits attempts to arrive at a genuinely social 
understanding of organisational knowledge; and thirdly, at least in some segments of the 
literature, a focus on simulated or experimental settings in seeking empirical support, 
rather than investigating what have been called ‘intact activity systems’ (Greeno, 1998). 
 
 
2.1 Information Processing and Representationalism 
 
One of the key elements of the information processing perspective is the positing of pre-
existing cognitive structures that guide perception and provide an important heuristic 
function in people’s information processing strategies.  Such structures have been 
variously referred to as frames (Minsky, 1975; Mitchell, 1986), scripts (Abelson, 1981; 
Schank and Abelson, 1977), schemata (Moussavi and Evans, 1993; Rummelhart, 1984), 
categories (Rosch, 1978), personal constructs (Kelly, 1955), cognitive maps (Tolman, 
1948), and mental models (Gentner and Stevens, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983).  Taking 
the form of simplified “internal working models of the world” (Badke-Schaub et al., 
2007, p. 7), these cognitive frameworks are seen as economising devices allowing 
predictions to be made about likely future states of affairs and channelling the 
assimilation of new information without undue cognitive effort (Craik, 1943; Johnson-
Laird, 1983).  In this sense, people are depicted as ‘cognitive misers’, relying on 
established frameworks, models, or schemata to economise on the use of limited 
cognitive and attentional resources (Fiske and Taylor, 1984).  This in itself is not 
problematic as a considerable volume of research has supported the existence of 
heuristics of various forms (e.g. Gilovich et al., 2002; Kahneman et al., 1982).  
However, difficulties arise when, as in the cognitive literature on organisational 
knowledge and learning, heuristics are conceived primarily as having a representational 
role, intended to mirror more or less faithfully, albeit in synoptic form, various 
phenomena ‘out there’ in the world (c.f. Rorty, 1979).  Winograd and Flores (1986, p. 
73) have summarised the key features of information processing approaches in the 
following terms: 
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At its simplest, the rationalistic view accepts the existence of an objective 
reality, made up of things bearing properties and entering into relations.  A 
cognitive being ‘gathers information’ about those things and builds up a ‘mental 
model’ which will be in some respects correct (a faithful representation of 
reality) and in other respects incorrect.  Knowledge is a storehouse of 
representations, which will be called upon for use in reasoning and which can be 
translated into language.  Thinking is a process of manipulating representations. 
 
The problem with representationalism is that it relies on a series of excessively strict 
dualisms between mind and body, thought and reality, individual and environment.  As 
Descombe (2001) has argued, the understanding of mental acts needs to be broadened 
out to embrace not only the states of mind of individual brains that appear as somehow 
detached from the world, and instead to emphasise the actively engaged, embodied, 
collective, culturally- and historically specific character of knowing.  It is arguably also 
the case that a representationalist view tends to prioritise structure over process and 
statics over dynamics.  As a consequence there has been less attention paid to how 
individual or organisational schemata are formed, reproduced, modified, or overturned 
over time, or how malleable they are depending on the alternative contexts and social 
settings within which they are drawn upon and performed (c.f. Goffman, 1959). 
 
 
2.2 Cognitivism and the Social Character of Knowing 
 
The second limitation of the cognitive tradition concerns the individualistic and 
mentalistic way in which knowing and acting are depicted (Norman, 1993; Schwartz, 
1998).  It may seem counter-intuitive that a body of work purporting to deal with the 
thoroughly social phenomena of organisational knowledge and learning could exhibit an 
individualistic bias, but this is evident in one of two tendencies in the literature.  The 
first, which sidesteps the issue of how social coordination is actually accomplished, 
simply treats organisations as if they are individual actors and draws analogies between 
individual and organisational cognition.  This style of argument can regularly be found 
in much of the writing on the economics of organisational knowledge and capabilities 
(e.g. Grant, 1996; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 1987).  Here the 
organisation is often reified as a unitary actor, based on the problematic assumption of 
an equivalence between individual and organisational cognition.  The second, which is 
equally flawed, treats organisational cognition as a straightforward aggregate of the 
individual cognitions of its members.  This approach can be found in the earlier IT 
focused writing on knowledge management that portrayed organisations as a collection 
of atomised individuals possessing different types of knowledge (e.g. Croy et al., 1997; 
Gore and Gore, 1999; Sher and Lee, 2004).  The challenge, which according to this 
view can be met through the widespread deployment of IT systems, is to connect up 
these different individuals, allowing knowledge to flow to where it is needed and 
allowing for “a vast treasure house of knowledge, know-how and best practices” to be 
exploited rather than remaining untapped (O’Dell and Grayson, 1988, p. 154).  As Swan 
et al. (1999, p. 273) suggest, “[c]ognitive, IT-led approaches to KM typically fail to take 
into account the pre-existing organizational structures, norms and cultural values that 
lead different groups to have divergent, possibly even irreconcilable, interpretations of 
what needs to be done and how best to do it.  They unrealistically assume that building 
networks that provide structural links between these different groups will somehow 
automatically produce knowledge creation and sharing”.  Neither of the above 
approaches is able to depict the socially and materially situated character of cognition as 
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a dynamic and relational process that is not something that purely goes on ‘in the heads’ 
of individuals, nor is a wholly collective phenomenon where the individual is 
effectively submerged within an ostensibly coherent and seamless collective agency. 
 
 
2.3 Positivism and the Experimental Approach 
 
A final limitation of orthodox cognitive psychology that has been imported into the 
literature on organisational knowledge and learning, more strongly in some quarters 
than others, concerns a positivist orientation towards collecting and analysing empirical 
evidence.  This tends to reinforce the pronounced individualistic, static, and 
functionalist perspective already evident in the way that organisational knowledge and 
learning are conceptualised by cognitive approaches.  This is particularly evident in 
those approaches that have adopted the same emphasis on experimental and simulation-
based methods as the cognitive psychology literature from which they draw inspiration.  
While not denying the potential usefulness of such techniques, it is also crucial to 
acknowledge their limitations.  Arguably their greatest strength is also their biggest 
weakness.  Experimental and simulation studies are able to provide settings in which 
variables can be controlled and manipulated to allow the researcher to focus on the role 
of those that are hypothesised to be of relevance.  However, the ability to manipulate 
experimental settings often comes at the cost of simplification and abstraction.  This 
means that they are typically limited in their ability to emulate the messy complexity of 
‘intact activity systems’ (Greeno, 1998) or cognition ‘in the wild’ (Hutchins, 1995).   
 
Ever more sophisticated experimental designs can ameliorate the problems of 
simplification and abstraction, but there are more inescapable features of such 
approaches that make them less suited for investigating the dynamic, unfolding, 
situated, context-dependent, and complexly interconnected processes of knowing and 
learning in practice.  The main problem is that such approaches tend towards 
reductionism in assuming that organisational cognition can best be understood by 
subdividing it into simpler components, factors, or variables that can then be 
reassembled to form a complex whole.  The aim of experimental approaches is to 
manipulate conditions so as to isolate one or a few features of interest.  For some, this is 
not considered problematic, either because there is thought to be a sufficient degree of 
resemblance between the experimental setting and non-artificial situations despite the 
decomposition and separation of ‘factors’; or alternatively features of the real world are 
simply not seen to be relevant to the phenomena being studied.  For example, Vera and 
Simon (1993, pp. 42-43) argue that for “many purposes of cognitive simulation, it is of 
no special significance that thought is social.  So long as a system is provided with a 
knowledge base that corresponds with the relevant knowledge possessed by the person 
who is being simulated, one need not be concerned with the original source of that 
knowledge”.  However, others remain unconvinced by these arguments.  For instance, 
Greeno (1998, p. 7) has observed that “[e]xperimental conditions are arranged to 
provide information about one of the processes of perception, comprehension, memory, 
inference, or judgement, assuming that the influence of other processes can be neglected 
in drawing conclusions about the process that the experiment was designed to 
investigate”.   
 
The problem is that by isolating factors, treating them as discrete and independent 
variables to be manipulated under experimental conditions, almost invariably 
encourages them to be hypostatised.  At worst this means that actors (whether individual 
or organisational) are themselves treated as bundles of individual characteristics, the 
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presence or absence of which in different combinations, and given alternative 
environmental conditions and stimuli, together influence behaviour.  Although it is not 
logically necessary for such studies, once organisations, individuals, and situations are 
reduced to a series of component parts, the emphasis is typically a narrowly functional 
one, investigating the effects and outcomes of these characteristics rather than 
considering how such features are constituted or how they change and evolve.  The 
individual characteristics and traits of cognitive agents come across as static attributes 
rather than actively and historically constituted elements.  Another tendency that seems 
to follow from such atomistic thinking is that of treating actors and the settings within 
which they act and interact in strongly dualistic terms, with contexts or environments 
forming a passive and container-like backdrop to organisational action. 
 
 
3. PRACTICE-BASED APPROACHES TO ORGANISATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
AND LEARNING 
 
Having looked at some of the main features and limitations of the cognitive tradition in 
the literature on organisational knowledge and learning, I would now like the consider 
the key benefits, but also disadvantages and omissions, of practice-based approaches.  
Although the latter are keen to distance themselves from cognitive explanations, I 
nevertheless argue that the two approaches are by no means as incompatible as is often 
claimed and that a fruitful dialogue could and should be established between them.  The 
strength of practice-based approaches is that they strive to offer a holistic understanding 
of knowing and learning as dynamic, emergent, social accomplishments that are 
actively situated within specific contexts of practice.  Consequently, they are able to 
counter some of the tendencies observed above in cognitive approaches towards 
depicting knowledge and learning in static, dualistic, internalised, and ultimately 
individualised terms.  According to Lave and Wenger (1991, pp. 50-51) “a theory of 
social practice emphasizes the relational interdependency of agent and world, activity, 
meaning, cognition, learning, and knowing.  It emphasizes the inherently socially 
negotiated character of meaning, and the interested, concerned character of the thought 
and action of persons-in-activity”.  Similarly, Gherardi (2001, p. 134) has argued that 
“when the locus of knowledge and learning is situated in practice, the focus moves to a 
social theory of action that addresses activity and passivity, the cognitive and the 
emotional, mental and sensory perception as bits and pieces of the social construction of 
knowledge and of the social worlds in which practices assume meanings and facticity”.  
Thus, a crucial feature of these approaches is a shift in focus from ‘cognition in the 
head’ to ‘cognition in practice’ (Lave, 1988). 
 
The emphasis is on the socially constituted, indeterminate, revisable, and negotiated 
character of knowledge.  This is in contrast to representationalist approaches that 
believe in the possibility of a mirror-like correspondence between external, independent 
phenomena and the mental structures and language used to represent them.  Practice-
based approaches are deeply critical of this, presenting instead a relational and process-
orientated view of the mutually constitutive nature of social phenomena which makes it 
meaningless to speak of them independently.  As Lave and Wenger (1991, p. 51) put it, 
“the socially and culturally structured world … is socially constituted; objective forms 
and systems of activity, on the one hand, and agents’ subjective and intersubjective 
understandings of them, on the other, constitute both the world and its experienced 
forms”.  It is from recognising the mutually constituted character of knowledge and 
practice that questions of context, situation, and setting come to the fore.  This is 
because at “issue here is not knowledge as a self-standing body of propositions but 
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identities and modes of action established through ongoing, specifically situated 
moments of lived work, located in and accountable to particular historical, discursive 
and material circumstances” (Suchman, 2000, pp. 312-313).  Once again there are 
important differences here with the cognitive approaches outline above which tend to 
treat the context or setting of organisational actions as a static, container-like backdrop.  
Practice-based approaches conceptualise context not simply as a container within which 
activities occur, but as crucially enacted whereby its elements are simultaneously 
influence on, medium, and outcome of social activity. 
 
One of the key advantages of practice-based approaches is that they seek to provide a 
historically situated account of practices, acknowledging that they follow complex and 
sometimes contradictory trajectories.  This is in opposition to some branches of the 
cognitive tradition that appear to portray organisational knowledge and learning as 
driven by universal and immutable tendencies, and thus as effectively ahistorical.  
However, I would argue that the anti-cognitive bias in practice-based approaches is both 
unnecessary and ultimately limiting.  One does not have to abandon any reference to 
cognition in order to avoid those pitfalls of cognitive approaches that practice-based 
theory so eloquently highlights.  Indeed, by being excessively reticent to speak of 
cognitive processes, practice-based approaches have closed down a fruitful avenue of 
investigation that may offer a more detailed understanding of how practices are 
constituted, reproduced, and transformed than they have so far been able to offer.  
Although there are those who doubt the potential of integrating sociological styles of 
interpretation - which practice-based theories typically draw upon - with cognitive 
approaches (e.g. Woolgar, 1995), there have nevertheless been some that have been 
working towards precisely such a rapprochement (e.g. Cicourel, 1973, 1981; Greeno, 
1998; Zerubavel, 1999).  There are a few practice-based theorists who have taken steps 
in this direction, notably the work of Orlikowski and Gash (1994) on technological 
frames, but such attempts have generally been few and far between. 
 
It is worth acknowledging that the practice-based critique of cognitive approaches is 
perhaps rather ingenuous, based as it is upon something of a caricature of the latter.  
Certainly by using the rhetorical device of setting themselves up in opposition to 
‘conventional’ or ‘traditional’ cognitive theories, practice-based theories are able to 
make their arguments stronger and more distinctive.  There is, however, a question mark 
over whether the rhetorical benefits of a thoroughgoing rejection of cognitive 
approaches does not come at the expense of ignoring any useful insights from this body 
of work at all.  Practice-based approaches are reticent about making reference to 
patterns, frameworks, or models of thinking, collective or otherwise, for fear of veering 
towards representationalism and mentalism (e.g. Gherardi, 2006; Lave and Wenger, 
1991).  However, one does not have to accept a representational or mentalist position to 
draw conceptual benefit from the notion that patterns of collective activity are, to some 
extent at least, enabled and guided by interlocking cognitive schemas that are, to a 
greater or lesser degree, generated, reproduced, and modified by people participating in 
joint activities.  Indeed, there is much to be gained for practice-based approaches in 
taking on board ideas from social cognition because it is arguably in the study of the 
interplay between individual and socially overlapping knowledge frameworks that 
important steps can be taken towards understanding the different circumstances under 
which practices are reproduced or transformed.  In opposition to the representationalist 
tendencies of the information processing view, taking such an interpretative perspective 
on cognition connects much more closely with many of the traditions from which 
practice-based theory draws, including pragmatism, phenomenology, symbolic 
interactionism, and social constructionism.  As such, it offers an appropriate route for 
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pursuing a rapprochement between practice-based and cognitive approaches.  Instead of 
viewing cognition in terms of the rule-based processing of information as 
representations of reality, the emphasis shifts to the role of interpretative schemas in 
guiding how unfolding social realities are constituted and enacted.  Schemata provide 
the crucial link between past, present, and future in these processes, permitting practices 
to be reproduced but also potentially transformed, and thus allowing genuine agency 
without voluntarism and regularities of action without determinism.  The next section 
considers some of the theoretical possibilities and challenges of integrating cognitive 
and practice-based approaches. 
 
 
4. COGNITION IN PRACTICE: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATION 
 
Fortunately, the theoretical foundations upon which practice-based theories of 
organisational knowledge and learning stand provide a solid starting point from which 
to develop a more socially and historically situated understanding of cognition.  
Practice-based approaches are often themselves inspired by a sociology of practice (e.g. 
Bourdieu, 1977, 1990; Garfinkel, 1967; Giddens, 1979, 1984), and contributions such as 
these have been rather less reticent to invoke cognitive processes, even if they do not 
fully elaborate how they fit into their explanatory frameworks.  For example, Giddens 
(1979, 1984) emphasises the knowledgeability of actors, highlighting the need for a 
knowledge of the rules, conscious or otherwise, to make people capable of action (c.f. 
Sewell, 1992).  Structuration theory makes reference to memory traces and pre-existing 
interpretative schemes as carriers that permit the reproducibility of practice.  However, 
it is not always clear the precise role these play and whether they can be conceptualised 
as having a cognitive dimension.  There are some who are unwilling to concede the 
possibility of recurrent practices, or scripts, being guided by cognitive frameworks.  For 
example, Barley and Tolbert (1997, p. 98, emphasis in the original) have argued that “it 
is empirically more fruitful to view scripts as behavioural regularities instead of mental 
models or plans.  From this perspective, scripts are observable, recurrent activities and 
patterns of interaction characteristic of a particular setting”.  However, this does not 
address how such patterns are actually formed and reproduced and it is here that I would 
suggest socially shared cognitions play a crucial part in guiding practices.  To claim the 
relevance of cognitive frameworks for reproducing social practices is in no way 
inconsistent with the crucial argument that such frameworks for knowing are embodied, 
inhere in, and are variably distributed across, specific social and material settings in 
which practices are actively situated.  To talk about schemata, mental models, and so 
on, does not have to conjure up images of knowing as taking place solely ‘in-the-head’.  
However, this does not mean that one has to deny any role for knowing-in-the-head for 
fear of mentalism.  This is providing, of course, that one does not make the mistake of 
depicting cognition entirely as an individual, internalised, rational, impassive, and 
dispassionate activity. 
 
Moreover, there are lessons from social cognition, in terms of the interplay between 
individual and collective knowledge and between automatic and active modes of 
cognition that can begin to address some of the key problems that a sociology of 
practice has been attempting to solve, arguably without total success (e.g. Louis and 
Sutton, 1991; Schwarz, 1998).  One of the most difficult of these is the question of how, 
once rules or patterns of recurrent action are established and effectively reproduced, 
they can be modified and transformed.  Contributions to a sociology of practice have 
tended to focus more on the conditions underlying the reproducibility of practice than 
its transformation.  This is probably most evident in the work of Bourdieu (1977, 1990) 
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where practice is depicted as taking place within a particular habitus.  The latter is 
defined as “an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the 
particular conditions in which it is constituted … engender[ing] all the thoughts, all the 
perceptions, and all the actions consistent with those conditions, and no others” 
(Bourdieu, 1977, p. 95).  Given such a conceptualisation it is difficult to see how 
transformations are possible if the grip of the habitus is so all-embracing and pervasive.   
 
Other work that has informed a sociology of practice, such as ethnomethodology, has 
been more open to the twin character of social practices as offering both the potential 
for routinisation and transformation.  While not denying that large elements of action, 
particularly in organisational settings, are routinised, relatively unreflexive, and 
grounded in taken-for-granted assumptions, this does not mean that the totality of 
behaviour is entirely automatic and habitual.  People are not ‘cultural dopes’, simply 
acting out established norms and patterns of behaviour (Garfinkel, 1967).  Certainly, as 
Garfinkel’s so-called ‘breaching experiments’ clearly demonstrated, there is a 
considerable amount of ‘work’ and implicit background knowledge that goes into 
sustaining even the most trivial of everyday activities that only comes to the surface 
when there is a breakdown, in the case of these experiments by purposefully breaching 
the expected rules of conduct.  However, this does not mean that social action is entirely 
and unchangingly rule-bound in the sense that there is no escape from collectively 
sanctioned norms of conduct.  For Garfinkel (1967), the potential for improvisation and 
autonomous action comes from the very fact that social rules have to be actively 
constituted and that a considerable amount of, generally unacknowledged, effort goes 
into reproducing them.  They may seem to be self-evident, immutable, and natural 
states-of-affairs, but they are nonetheless the product of concerted human action.  This 
is not dissimilar to the discussion of reification in social constructionism (Berger and 
Luckman, 1966).  Being the product of human action, rather than fully naturalised 
categories, social rules and norms always contain the potential, however infinitesimal, 
for their own transformation. 
 
This potential for transforming social rules and norms has been directly recognised by a 
number of practice-based organisation theorists.  As Gherardi (2006, p. 29) has 
commented, “social norms are indexical, with the consequence that a rule of behaviour 
does not have a univocal meaning outside the concrete settings where it is applied.  This 
thesis stresses in particular that the range of application of a rule is always constituted 
by an a priori indefinable number of different situations, so that a norm is always 
applied ‘for another first time’ … and a routine work practice is always executed for 
‘another first time’”.  Similarly, Feldman and Pentland (2003) have highlighted the 
partly reflective and performative character of rules and norms of conduct as a way of 
exploring the interplay between the reproducibility and transformability of routine 
practices.  They use the distinction between ostensive and performative forms of power 
specified by Latour (1986) to offer a reworking of the notion of organisational routines.  
According to their definition, the “ostensive aspect is the ideal or schematic form of a 
routine.  It is the abstract, generalized idea of the routine, or the routine in principle.  
The performative aspect of the routine consists of specific actions, by specific people, in 
specific places and times.  It is the routine in practice.  Both of these aspects are 
necessary for an organizational routine to exist” (Feldman and Pentland, 2003, p. 101).  
Accordingly, rules and norms in their formal or ostensive sense can never be all-
encompassing because they always rely on being enacted through performances.   
 
However, what has received less attention in these accounts is the notion that the 
performance of rules and norms by necessity relies upon an active, if often implicit, 
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background of interpretations and assumptions, in an ongoing flow of mutually 
constituting interactions.  These are needed to reproduce normative behaviour to give it 
its regularised character, but also offer the potential for its transformation through 
unintentional modifications and the reflexive self-monitoring of more conscious agency 
(Emirbayer and Mische, 1998).  A key issue here is not only that individuals are active 
agents in the reproduction and potential transformation of social rules and normative 
expectations, but also that the process of fitting together norms, dispositions, and 
situations is a crucially interpretive accomplishment.  In order to orientate their 
behaviour by calling upon different normative or dispositional elements that are more or 
less appropriate to the situation, individuals must first make sense of the what the 
situation is, often on the basis of quite fragmentary, fleeting, and incomplete evidence.  
How one makes sense of situations is, in turn, influenced by what Hochschild (1979) 
called ‘framing rules’ and Cicourel (1973) termed ‘interactional competence’.  In either 
case it is not only knowledge of the rules that is needed, but also a practical sense of 
how and where they can be applied.  For Cicourel (1973) there is a crucially cognitive 
dimension to the ability to generate situationally appropriate actions in that both 
normative expectations and the understanding of situations are guided by interpretive 
schemata.   
 
This is something that practice-based approaches, and sociology more generally, have 
avoided recognising.  Yet, as Sewell (1992, p. 7, emphasis in original) has argued in 
relation to structuration theory, this leads to something of an omission: “Giddens places 
a great deal of weight on the notion that actors are knowledgeable.  It is, presumably, 
the knowledge of rules that makes people capable of action.  But Giddens develops no 
vocabulary for specifying the content of what people know”.  Cicourel (1981, p. 101) 
has made much the same point in suggesting that “[t]aking seriously the notion of 
schema theory should force sociologists to recognize the necessity of an explicit theory 
of meaning.  Sociological theory often treats meaning as obvious or as a residual 
category”.  Using the example of the constitution of project management practices in 
consulting engineering, the next section offers an illustration of how the interplay of 
interpretative schemata, norms, and situations can be approached empirically.  This 
provides an opportunity to reflect upon not only the conceptual challenges of integrating 
cognitive and practice-based approaches, but also the non-trivial issues of method that 
arise when attempting such an integration. 
 
 
5. REPRESENTING AND PERFORMING PROJECT WORK: AN 
ILLUSTRATION 
 
This illustration is drawn from a study currently being conducted by the author into the 
practices of multi-functional project teams.  It focuses on one of two teams being 
studied through a combination of ethnographic observation and other methods for 
investigating patterns of team knowledge, such as cognitive mapping and documentary 
analysis.  The team in question, which undertakes capital projects in the utilities sector, 
has members representing different functions, roles, disciplines, and organisational 
affiliations.  It is responsible for delivering an extensive series of projects over a five 
year period as part of a large capital investment programme.  In terms of the methods 
chosen for the study, a multi-method case study approach was selected as an appropriate 
way of addressing the research questions.  The two principal methods used are 
ethnographic observation and cognitive mapping which, despite making strange 
bedfellows, arguably offer complementary insights that partly counteract each other’s 
weaknesses.   
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There is a tendency in practice-based theories to assume that the intelligibility of 
situated practices can mainly be grasped through observation.  This is founded on an 
argument drawn from ethnomethodology where the indexicality of practices, in which 
their meaning is tied to specific contexts of action, is such that those participating in 
them are able to, and routinely do, provide their own accounts of what they do.  This 
offers a foundation for reflexive action, but crucially also, so the argument goes, allows 
external observers to reconstruct the meaning of practices through observation.  While 
ethnomethodology can be criticised for exaggerating the transparency of practice to 
those involved, and particularly to those outside a given field of practice, there are 
nevertheless key benefits to approaches based on the longitudinal observation of, and 
engagement in, activity settings for investigating knowledge-in-action.  Without 
becoming deeply embedded in the setting being studied it is difficult for the researcher 
to appreciate the context-specific, localised, and emergent character of practices.  To 
this end, the research has involved repeated visits to the various team locations to 
observe the day-to-day activities of its members, particularly in their formal and 
informal interactions.  To date this has involved around 45 days contact with the team 
over a twelve month period, with visits to the other case study team being conducted 
partly in parallel.  As well as detailed notes and, where possible, direct transcripts of 
meetings held for a variety of reasons (from team level discussions to detailed planning, 
progress, design, and implementation meetings), a fieldwork diary was kept for each 
visit containing a record of observations, conversations, and other points of potential 
interest.  As far as possible, this has been based on an attempt not to pre-select and 
censor events that only meet my preconceptions about the setting I am trying to 
understand.  This is frequently easier said than done and conscious efforts need to be 
made to counteract the influence of familiarity on observations as the amount of contact 
time with the team increases.  The danger here is that with the growing routinisation of 
research interactions over time it also becomes more difficult to appreciate the recurrent 
character of those team practices that are the target of the research. 
 
Contrary to the assumption often found in practice-based approaches that observation is 
the only secure route to comprehending a field of practice, I would suggest that social 
practices are often more opaque to outsiders than frequently claimed.  The previous 
point about the researcher becoming absorbed in the taken-for-granted nature of a 
practice indicates the paradoxical nature of observational research.  Familiar to 
anthropologists, the paradox is that in order to understand the rule-based and routine 
nature of practices, the researcher must allow him or herself to become, at least partly, 
engaged in those practices and thus risks treating them in the same taken-for-granted 
way as the research participants under study.  With minimal engagement, the researcher 
is presented with a potentially bewildering series of obscure activities and the danger is 
that their meaning is interpreted solely according to the researcher’s existing conceptual 
schemas.  However, by developing the degree of engagement required to begin to 
understand the meaning of practices as it appears to those involved in them, it becomes 
likely that the more routine or ‘normal’ activities go unobserved as they no longer have 
the capacity through unfamiliarity to capture the attention. 
 
Recognising the challenges and limitations of observational work, the study has also 
drawn on other methods, particularly cognitive mapping, as a technique for eliciting 
team members’ perspectives on project work.  Using the issue of what constitutes and 
differentiates ‘good projects’ and ‘bad projects’ as an opening thematic prompt, team 
members are asked to construct cognitive maps of their immediate responses to this 
theme side-by-side with the researcher using the mapping software package Decision 
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Explorer™.  So far 30 mapping interviews have been conducted, each lasting around 1-
1½ hours, and I am currently involved in repeat interviews with those participants who 
are still available to see the extent to which their thematic priorities have changed over 
the intervening period of several months since the original mapping exercises were 
undertaken.  For each of the mapping interviews, the emphasis was on minimising the 
amount of prompting provided to participants beyond explaining the mechanics of the 
mapping process, introducing the initial thematic prompt, and clarifying the wording of 
the concepts as they were recorded by the researcher using, as far as possible, the 
respondent’s own words.  Audio recordings and transcriptions of both the initial and 
follow-up interviews have been made, providing an important cross-reference during 
the subsequent analysis of the resulting maps (see Figure 1 for some examples of maps 
generated with team members). 
 
The status of the representations developed through cognitive mapping in its various 
forms have been the subject of vigorous debate (e.g. Bougon, 1992; Daniels and 
Johnson, 2002; Hodgkinson, 2002; Scheper and Faber, 1994).  While this is by no 
means inevitable, cognitive mapping is frequently associated with some of the less 
beneficial characteristics of conventional cognitive psychology, as outlined above.  In 
other words, there is the danger through cognitive mapping of promoting a static, 
individualistic, and representationalist view of knowledge, often accompanied by a 
strongly positivist and functionalist research orientation.  At its most extreme, there is 
the risk of conflating cognitive maps as verbal and visual representations of ideas or 
perspectives, with cognitive maps as a metaphor for heuristic and schematically guided 
processes of perception and interpretation.  At best, as Swan (1997) has observed, 
cognitive maps are representations of representations, and incomplete and fragmentary 
ones at that.  However, as a corollary of my suggestion that to draw on insights from the 
cognitive tradition does not have to mean that one accepts all its attendant problems, 
providing its limitations are acknowledged, cognitive mapping can be used as an 
effective method for gathering perspectives about a particular domain.  This does not 
inevitably mean that the method has to be used in a static, functionalist, and positivist 
way.   
 
By treating the resulting representations generated from the mapping sessions not as 
final and definitive mirrors of an individual’s thinking, but rather as partial, provisional, 
and revisable documents charting a person’s perspectives on a given theme at a specific 
point in time, many of the above difficulties fall away.  The resulting cognitive maps are 
not an end-product, as they appear to be treated in some studies, but instead take the 
form of incomplete markers that can be positioned and compared relative to the activity 
setting of the respondents.  Without this they remain abstract and fixed with no sense of 
how they are mutually constituted in practice.  This is where the ethnographic element 
of the research comes back in.  By taking a multi-method approach, it is possible to use 
cognitive mapping in a much more situated and dynamic way than has usually been the 
case, while at the same time providing another window into the nature of practice that 
does not depend entirely on insights drawn from observation.  The following examples 
are drawn from both elements of the study and the crucial attempts to trace out the 
connections between them. 
 
 
5.1 Schemas of Project Work 
 
One of the key rationales behind using a cognitive mapping approach has been to 
attempt to identify if there are any patterns or regularities in the ways that multi-
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functional project team members represent the nature of their work.  A major 
methodological challenge here has been how to make meaningful comparisons across 
what are quite individual and idiosyncratic maps.  The relative benefits and 
disadvantages of ideographic (as employed in this study) as opposed to nomothetic 
mapping techniques has been a major topic of discussion in the study of organisational 
cognition (e.g. Daniels and Johnson, 2002; Hogkinson, 2002).  The main problem with 
comparing cognitive maps collected using an ideographic approach is that, with fewer 
limits on what concepts respondents are able to talk about and an emphasis on allowing 
them to express themselves in their own words, the researcher is left with the potentially 
enormous task of painstakingly examining and cross-checking each concept and the 
relationships between them manually rather than with the aid of, at least partly, 
automated analytical techniques to which nomothetic approaches lend themselves more 
readily.  However, for the purposes of the present study, where it has been important not 
to impose a priori limitations on the concepts employed by respondents so as not to 
eliminate potential points of difference, the challenges of analysing ideographic 
cognitive maps were judged to be a worthwhile price to pay for addressing the research 
questions.  In order to make a comparative analysis possible, the maps have been 
subject to qualitative interpretation and coding using an emergent and iterative coding 
scheme that is still being refined as further data are collected.  The aim of the coding has 
been to reduce the overwhelming number of concepts elicited through the mapping by 
grouping them into overarching themes.  Thus, where it is possible to detect thematic 
similarities between the concepts used by respondents, despite precise variations in 
wording and forms of expression, these have been grouped together under a more 
inclusive label.   
 
The next stage in the analysis has been to identify patterns across these themes to see 
where team members agree and disagree on their perspectives of project work.  The 
coding has also been used as the basis for a cluster analysis to explore whether there are 
regularities of response between specific segments of the project team according to 
potential bases of identity construction (e.g. role, discipline, organisational affiliation, 
educational background, age, gender, etc.).  However, the results of that aspect of the 
research will not be reported here.  Instead, I would like to concentrate on the overall 
degree of overlap (or otherwise) in team members’ perspectives on project work and 
how far they coincide with orthodox images of project management without going into 
detail on patterns at the sub-group level.  The idea is to give some indication of the 
extent to which the typical norms of project work are apparent in the concepts that 
project members articulate in their self-characterisation of what they do.  I will discuss 
some important caveats regarding the status and interpretation of these data in due 
course, but leaving those aside for the time being the indications emerging from he 
mapping side of the study are as follows. 
 
Based on the coding of concepts from the maps collected from a cross-section of team 
members, Figure 2 depicts the degree to which thematic areas are shared across the 
team.  It should be evident from the overall character of themes covered that there is a 
fairly strong appearance of those supporting a technical, rational, and instrumental view 
on project management.  However, perhaps the most telling indications of this come 
from those themes that are shared by the majority of maps.  Here the usual 
preoccupations of project management thinking come to the fore, not least the ‘iron 
triangle’ of time, cost, and quality.  Having said that, it is worth noting that time and 
cost, the pre-eminent pillars of managerial instrumentalism, actually make an 
appearance in more project members’ maps of project work than does quality.  Other 
popular themes that are in line with conventional project management thinking include: 
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planning, control and monitoring; issues about scope of work and establishing a clear 
direction to follow; processes, standards, and regulations; resource allocation; a focus 
on delivering actions, outcomes, and outputs; and so on.  Not all the central themes are 
quite so technically-orientated but are arguably equally rational and instrumental in 
flavour.  These include issues about staffing and personnel, such as team selection and 
role allocation; how to motivate the team through appropriate incentives; how to 
organise and arrange team relationships to promote enhanced performance; and how to 
streamline communications between different parties. 
 
While the themes in the middle of the diagram give an indication of the issues around 
which there appears to be team consensus, suggesting the existence of collective norms 
surrounding what is involved in project work, it is important not to forget the widely 
ranging collection of themes arrayed around the edge that are shared by a smaller 
proportion of the maps.  Admittedly many of these are subsets or elaborations of what 
tend to be more abstract and generalised categories in the centre (e.g. ‘deadlines and 
milestones’ are a sub-category of ‘time and programme’).  This means that it is little 
surprise there is less overlap because they are simply specific and more individualised 
instances of the global project management topics that dominate the middle.  However, 
it does also underline the overall technical, rational, and instrumental flavour of the 
concepts covered by the maps.  Further refinements of the coding scheme will 
concentrate on clarifying the hierarchical relationships or nesting between themes to 
address potential difficulties in adequately charting the shared occurrence of themes 
across all the different maps.  However, it should be clear that some of the outlying 
themes are less readily subsumed under the more generic issues that have been more 
regularly referred to by respondents.  Some interesting examples include: innovation 
and new ideas, learning, responsibility and accountability, environmental issues, 
emotional issues, and help, advice, and mentoring.  While, of course, it is entirely 
possible to take a quite instrumental view on each of these themes, to the extent that 
they could be the target of purposeful manipulation to enhance project delivery, they are 
perhaps less obviously in the mould of orthodox project management thinking.  An 
important question arising from this is whether the patterning and distribution of themes 
across the maps supports the view of conventional project management ideas being 
normalised to the extent that such views are broadly shared by most people in the team.  
Certainly the initial indications are that this is the case, with the more popular images of 
project work being quite orthodox while other perhaps less conventional themes are not 
shared so widely. 
 
 
5.2 Performing Project Management Schemas 
 
Having seen strong indications from the case study team members’ cognitive maps of 
quite orthodox norms of project management thinking, a major question arises as to how 
far such schematic assumptions about their work guides their conduct in practice, and 
equally how their everyday practices shape their perspectives of what they do.  From the 
earlier discussion about the performative and open-ended character of norms and rules 
of behaviour, it should be clear that they are not universal and unchanging, but rather 
actively, and often incompletely, constituted through situated practices.  It would, 
therefore, be surprising to find the complete penetration of a field of practice by a 
single, all-embracing form of rationality, such as that represented by orthodox schemas 
of project management.  Some counter-currents to the dominant images of project 
management have already been seen in the themes emerging from the maps in the form 
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of concepts and issues that do not comfortably fit the collective norms.  Indications 
from the observations of team practices are equally ambivalent, if not more so. 
 
Certainly there are clear outward signs of conventional project management thinking 
observable in the case study setting.  These include the usual techniques of control and 
ordering, such as detailed project procedures that follow a linear stage model, Gantt 
charts and other tools for planning time and resources, and regular meetings and 
documentation processes designed to report on, monitor, and adjust progress.  Many of 
these tools and procedures are formally prescribed and codified in considerable detail 
within the company’s IT systems.  Here the standard project process, with its clear 
sequence of stages, milestones, and decision points for technical and financial approval, 
are laid out.  Underneath these are then arrayed a progressively more elaborate 
hierarchy of work instructions describing in minute detail the actions that need to be 
undertaken within each stage of the project.  However, from observing the behaviour of 
the team as they perform tasks specified by this overall sequence, it quickly becomes 
clear that such norms of project practice are not undertaken automatically and without 
reflection and critique.  Indeed, it is evident that many team members display a quite 
ambivalent stance to the formal project procedures, combining elements of frustration 
and cynicism about their precise form, while at the same time usually complying with 
their underlying logic by leaving the fundamental existence of such features as a clear 
sequence of project stages largely unquestioned.   
 
For example, at a presentation on how to use the project extranet, the presenter – a 
programme manager from another team – demonstrates a link within the system to the 
company’s formal project stage model.  One of the design engineers points out that this 
is not actually the sequence of events that happens within his team.  Due to differences 
in the contractual arrangements for the type of work undertaken by the team, detailed 
design and one of the project stage gates are in a different place than indicated in the 
model.  The presenter says that the diagram was created from the point of view of the 
work undertaken by his team and other teams involved in similar work and admits that 
it does not reflect what happens in all parts of the company.  The engineer asks whether 
it would be possible to modify the diagram to reflect this.  The initial response of the 
presenter is as follows: “I’m happy to change it, but I’m just saying there’s half the 
company it applies to and half that it doesn’t and you’re unfortunately in the half that it 
doesn’t”.  Another design engineer then asks whether it might not be possible to show 
within the existing diagram that there are actually two somewhat different stage models 
relevant to different teams in the company.  The presenter agrees to look into this.  What 
this short episode suggests is that there is an acknowledgement of the limitations and 
contradictions inherent in attempts to establish formal project procedures.   
 
Contrary to the universalising impulses of project management contained in the logic of 
a fixed sequence of project stages applicable to all projects, the engineers in the 
exchange above clearly recognise that there needs to be some flexibility in this 
sequence.  If they were actually to follow the formal procedures for project stages as 
encapsulated in the project extranet to the letter, they would end up carrying out 
activities that were inappropriate for the nature of the work that they do and, 
paradoxically, undermine the performative intentions of having formal procedures.  
Instead of being an innate, naturalised, and immutable element of project work, the 
‘project stage process’ is problematised as a context-dependent device whose 
constitution depends crucially on social and political influences.  The fact that the 
general project stage model for the company takes the particular form that it does speaks 
volumes about the relative position and interests of those responsible for its design.  The 
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model has been created around the specific needs and activities of this group and then 
presented as the definitive company procedure without, it seems, even realising that 
there might be limits to its applicability across different areas of the company.  By 
questioning the relevance of the stage model to their own activities, the members of the 
case study team are opening up some cracks in the rationalistic veneer of the project 
stage process, not to question the overall existence of some form of project staging, but 
to assert the local character of their practices by declaring that this is not the way that 
things are done around here. 
 
Another example of the often critical way in which team members reflect upon formal 
procedures is provided by a discussion I had with a design engineer who had recently 
joined the team from a company-level programme for defining and implementing a 
range of process improvement projects.  He described how this improvement 
programme was strictly based around the PRINCE2 (PRojects in Controlled 
Environments) project management methodology (OGC, 2005).  This is a tightly 
sequential and carefully controlled process-driven approach to project management that 
involves the initial formation of a Business Case and its subsequent review on a regular 
basis.  The engineer commented on how he thought the documentation requirements for 
this approach are excessive and that the procedures are generally too cumbersome for 
most activities.  He went on to say that the use of a high profile approach, such as 
PRINCE2, which attempts to present itself as the current best practice for managing 
projects, is probably being used by the company’s process improvement programme 
less as a workable approach and more as a visible display of their being at the cutting 
edge in project management terms and a justification for the resources they have been 
given to undertake their work.  He outlined two reasons for this.  Firstly, the 
improvement programme is mostly staffed by people who have not come from an 
engineering or project background and so he thinks that they may be keen to 
demonstrate their project management credentials within an organisation that overall 
has a strong technical orientation.  Ironically, by choosing a methodology that many 
practising project managers and engineers within the engineering side of the company 
consider to be overly complicated and bureaucratic, the result has arguably been the 
opposite of that intended by the process improvement team.  Rather than demonstrating 
their legitimate membership within the project management community, they have 
unwittingly set themselves apart.  This is because their slavish following of PRINCE2 
principles appears in stark contrast to the more experience-based, rule-of-thumb, and 
commonsensical image of practice that the established project management community 
within the company likes to portray.  Secondly, having made a number of “quick wins” 
in improving processes, the engineer suggested that most of the “low hanging fruit” had 
been picked and that further measurable improvements would be both less dramatic and 
slower in coming.  He argued that since it was now becoming difficult to prove the 
outcomes of these improvement projects, more emphasis was being placed on the 
activities being undertaken rather than their outcomes to demonstrate that something 
was being achieved.  PRINCE2, with its detailed “paper trail” of documentation was, 
according to the engineer, an effective way of achieving this even if it ultimately did not 
contribute to the aims of the programme.  What is most interesting in this illustration is 
not that the use of project management discourses as a political tool for legitimating 
particular activities and access to resources, or as a badge of membership in a given 
community, can be readily shown to depart from the calmly rational and instrumental 
image of project management orthodoxy.  The more important point is that this critique 
shows the clear capacity of practitioners to reflect critically upon what they do, in this 
case demonstrating a less than complete acceptance of conventional project 
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management norms and a clear orientation towards not taking the claims of formally 
prescribed approaches too seriously. 
 
The above example is by no means an exception in the team.  Discussions among team 
members, both in formal and informal interactions, often involve a questioning attitude 
towards what might be considered conventional project management thinking.  It is in 
these episodes that one can find indications of multiple rationalities that are often 
contradictory.  Sometimes these contradictions are left untouched, particularly by 
splitting rationalities into distinct domains (e.g. professional and personal life, work and 
home, individual and organisation), thus allowing people to cope with the potential 
conflict.  In these instances some norms, values, or beliefs are often privileged while 
others are allowed to play a less prominent role, a typical example being the self-
regulation of personal beliefs that are not thought to be in line with the collective norms 
of conduct at work (bearing in mind that we have emphasised the provisional and 
contested character of the latter).  In other cases, the tensions can not so easily be 
contained and erupt into situations where attempts are made to repair and resolve the 
contradiction. 
 
The following illustration, taken from a discussion at another of the team’s monthly 
meetings, suggests how multiple rationalities are a regular feature of organisational life 
within the team.  In this example, members of the team are discussing the recent 
requirement introduced by the company to complete a waste management plan when 
planning their projects.  This is being implemented with the intention of reducing the 
environmental impact of projects through increased on-site recycling of waste materials, 
reduced landfill, and fewer vehicle movements.  A manager has come from the head 
office to explain the new requirements.  Throughout his explanation he repeatedly 
emphasises how there is a good financial business case for reducing waste.  This focus 
on reducing corporate social and environmental responsibility issues to a financial 
rationale by portraying such practices as also good for the bottom line is perhaps what 
one might expect from an orthodox managerialist perspective.  However, rather than 
accept this rationale at face value, different members of the team questioned the way 
that the changes to waste management procedures were being justified to them.  The 
team leader was particularly vociferous on this point, saying that he would “like to hear 
the company say this is what you should do because it’s the right thing to do” not 
simply because there is a workable business case for it.   
 
However, at a subsequent meeting a few months later, the issue of reducing the impact 
of projects on the environment was again raised, except that this time views about the 
relative priority of such matters had changed quite radically.  This was because in the 
intervening period a major reorganisation had been set in motion within the company 
with a strong focus on improving efficiency and concentrating only on business critical 
activities.  Each of the project areas was under extreme pressure to show demonstrable 
improvements and so, to avoid being the target of senior management interventions, the 
team’s management was now retreating into a more conventional position on such 
things as environmental and social responsibility.  The team leader was still keen to 
promote an ethos where team members are encouraged to think about their wider 
responsibilities and ‘do the right thing’, except that now he emphasised that this had to 
take second place to questions of efficiency.  He is keen to justify this change of 
position, counterposing his own interpretation and beliefs against what are portrayed as 
the inescapable realities of business: 
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“You can’t be a company like ours and not have environmental and 
sustainability objectives … It’s the money thing isn’t it?  How far would you go 
to pay to have good environmental consequences … So money always comes 
into it and that’s why the word sustainability is always thrown in there because 
… sustainability doesn’t mean saving up things now so that you can use them 
later on in the day.  That’s what it should mean.  Doing things now that mean we 
exist and we can function … in the future is what sustainable means in my view.  
But what it means to us is not doing this if it doesn’t pay back.  Sustainable … 
means can the company afford it.  Because if it can’t afford to do these things 
even though it wants to do them, it won’t exist”. 
 
What this example shows is the interplay of quite different rationalities – a more private 
belief system about environmental sustainability and a more public, role-constrained 
position that ultimately takes precedence within the changing context of the company’s 
organisational initiatives.  The implication is not only that different and potentially 
competing discourses can coexist within a particular setting of practice, sometimes 
rubbing up against each other in the form of tensions and contradictions, but also that 
such discourses and the interplay between them are not static but are instead 
dynamically constituted and situated within a whole range of other interlocking 
practices.  This is something that is difficult to detect in the earlier cognitive mapping 
data because, unless repeated at different points in time, they represent a single snapshot 
of an individual’s perspectives on a given set of issues.  From this it is easy to assume 
that all of the perspectives expressed are equally enduring when it is more likely that 
some will make a relatively regular appearance, at least in some form, in somebody’s 
views over time, while others will be more ephemeral, temporarily reflecting the salient 
features of the more immediate situation.  Thus, while it is possible to detect a 
continuing concern about not taking an excessively hard-nosed and instrumental 
position on environmental issues in the team leader’s professed views over time, there is 
an important shift in how these are represented relative to other perspectives.  With the 
changing political climate accompanying the company’s reorganisation, the team 
management’s zone of manoeuvre narrows and they self-consciously subordinate their 
own more personal beliefs to those of an increasingly powerful corporate discourse of 
efficiency.  Despite this, the team leader’s strong personal stance on issues other than 
purely technical efficiency has not been displaced in all instances by the new pressures 
from the corporate level.  Thus, despite calls from the head office to ‘streamline’ health 
and safety procedures in the new efficiency drive, this was not something that he was 
prepared to compromise on.  In direct contradiction to the directive that had been issued 
he instructed his staff to continue to carry out all existing health and safety related 
activities and said that he would take responsibility if they ran into any problems by 
doing this.  Once again this highlights the shifting and power-laden tension between 
alternative rationalities and modes of practice in which the outcomes are never entirely 
predictable and secure.  This is because there is always the scope for some resistance, 
however small it may be, as people have the capacity to reflect upon and readjust what 
they do.  Certainly this capacity is not unlimited and is crucially constrained by existing 
patterns and norms of thought and conduct, but it is precisely the fact that such norms 
need to be actively constituted to be reproduced over time that provides the opening for 
their potential transformation. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has put forward the argument that cognitive and practice-based traditions in 
the study of organisational knowledge and learning both have important contributions to 
make to our understanding of the field.  However, the full potential of these 
contributions has been hamstrung by a lack of positive interchange between the two 
traditions.  This is because these two broad approaches have typically been presented as 
incommensurable and so have eschewed the opportunity of learning from each other.  
What I have argued is that the incompatibility of cognitive and practice-based 
approaches has been exaggerated and that both have something to contribute to the 
other.  Practice-based theories offer a crucial corrective to many of the weaknesses of 
the cognitive tradition, including the latter’s tendency to portray knowledge in static, 
individualistic, and representationalist terms.  Instead, practice-based approaches have 
emphasised the dynamic and situated character of knowing in practice as a culturally, 
historically, and socially constituted accomplishment.  However, I have also argued that 
the criticism of cognitive approaches by practice-based theories relates primarily to only 
one, albeit dominant, strand of the cognitive tradition based on the idea of information 
processing and fails to take into account ideas from cognitive psychology that are by no 
means subject to the same difficulties.  In their efforts to avoid mentalism and 
representationalism at all costs, practice-based approaches have tended to reject any and 
all cognitive explanations.  This is unfortunate because there are insights that practice-
based theories can derive from a more socially situated and dynamic understanding of 
cognitive processes.  In particular, the former tend to struggle to provide an adequate 
account of both the reproducibility and transformability of social practices and it is here 
that the notion of shared schemas drawn from cognitive psychology can offer fruitful 
avenues of exploration.  I have suggested that schemas are the cognitive equivalent of 
social rules and norms, and that they are central in underpinning the interpretative 
competence necessary to constitute, but also potentially transform, situationally 
appropriate actions.  At the same time, the performative dimension of recurrent 
practices in turn helps to constitute their ostensive or schematic component, 
reproducing, modifying, or overturning established frameworks and assumptions in an 
ongoing flow of mutually constituting interactions. 
 
While the integration of cognitive and practice-based approaches presents some 
important conceptual challenges, it is also crucial not to underestimate the 
methodological issues associated with bringing the two traditions together.  Just as 
cognitive and practice-based approaches have tended to pursue quite distinct theoretical 
programmes, they also typically rely on quite different methods.  Using an illustration 
drawn from a current study I have been conducting, I have attempted to show how in 
the area of empirical method, as much as theory, there are benefits to be gained from 
combining the methods of cognitive psychology, in this case cognitive mapping, with 
those of practice-based approaches, in the form of detailed ethnographies of practice.  
The illustration shows how multiple methods can provide different lenses on how 
participants represent and perform their joint activities in practice.  Using examples of 
shared schemas of project work and the extent to which they both constitute and are 
constituted by the day-to-day working practices of a team of consulting engineers, I 
have endeavoured to show that the interplay between the two is by no means 
straightforward.  From the cognitive mapping data it appears that team members share a 
quite similar core of assumptions concerning their project practices, taking the form of 
rather formal, abstract, and conventional images of project management.  However, 
from the observational data it is clear that these schematic representations offer only an 
incomplete guide to action, with the nature of project work coming across as 
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considerably more contested and negotiated within different social settings compared 
with the more definitive and less ambivalent character of individual schemas elicited 
through the mapping exercises.  While the implications of this have yet to be explored 
fully, there is an interesting mismatch between the project practices of team members 
and the way that they represent these practices.  Such gaps between thinking, saying, 
and doing are, of course, a regular feature of organisational life, as typified by the 
distinction drawn by Argyris and Schön (1978) between espoused theories and theories-
in-use.  This raises important questions about the reasons for such differences and the 
extent to which cognitive schemata and situated practices are co-conditioning that need 
to be more thoroughly addressed.  Nevertheless, while there is still much to be done in 
drawing together cognitive and practice-based approaches, and especially in 
operationalising them empirically, I hope to have shown that the potential benefits to be 
gained from doing so make the attempt worthwhile. 
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Figure 1: Examples of Team Member Cognitive Maps 
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Figure 2: Percentage Occurrence of Themes Across Team Member Cognitive Maps 
 
 
 
